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NOTES AND COMMENTS
MEDICAL PRIVACY RIGHTS IN ANONYMOUS DATA: DISCUSSION OF
RIGHTS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE UNITED STATES IN
LIGHT OF THE SOURCE INFORMA TICS CASES

I. INTRODUCTION
1
Privacy is the ability to control knowledge about ourselves.
Invasion of privacy occurs when an individual is deprived of the
ability, or the autonomy, to preclude unauthorized users from
accessing the individual's personal information. 2 Accordingly, a
patient's right to privacy is violated when personal medical
information is revealed to an unauthorized third party. 3 As this
Note discusses, this should hold true even if such information is
rendered anonymous by the removal of all data relating to the
4
patient's identity.
Nevertheless, in 1999, a British appellate court held that
pharmacists are permitted to make unauthorized use, including
disclosure, of anonymous patient data, 5 for whatever purpose they
wish.6 The ruling was a result of requests by data-collection
companies to purchase information about drugs prescribed to

1. Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 483 (1968).
2. Id. at 482-83. "To be deprived of this control not only over what we do but over
who we are is the ultimate assault on liberty, personality, and self-respect." Id. at 485.
3. See generally Lawrence 0. Gostin, Health Information Privacy, 80 CORNELL L.
REV. 451,485-89 (1995) (indicating that the proliferation of medical data collection allows
access to numerous authorized and unauthorized users, which creates many opportunities
for invasion of privacy).
4. See discussion infra Part VI.
5. R. v. Dep't of Health ex parte Source Informatics Ltd., 1 All E.R. 786, 796-97
(C.A. 2000), rev'g 4 All E.R. 185 (Q.B. 1999). The data obtained in this case was the
physician's name, the date of prescription, the product and the quantity prescribed. Id. at
788.
6. According to the appellate court, the central issue was whether the "duty of
confidence to patients prevent[s] pharmacists from using the material contained in the
[general practitioner's] prescription forms for whatever purposes they wish." Id. at 788. It
held that the pharmacist is only limited by his or her conscience. Id. at 796.
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patients. 7 The British Department of Health responded to the
purchases by issuing a policy statement to physicians and
pharmacists that discouraged the sale of the prescription drug
data, even when the data does not identify the patients. 8 The
policy stated that "under common law... the general rule is that
information given in confidence [by a patient] may not be
disclosed without the consent of the provider of the information." 9
The Department of Health warned that any physician or
pharmacist "disclosing, prescribing or dispensing information in
the way described will be incurring legal risks. On policy grounds,
... [the Department] would strongly discourage all such
disclosures." 10 The policy guidelines warned that if doctors or
pharmacists participated in the data 11collection plan, they would
breach the confidence of the patients.
As a result of the policy statement, general practitioners
refused to sell their patients' prescription drug information to the
data-collection companies. 12 Physicians that previously agreed to
the sale refused to perform on their contracts. 13 Consequently, the
policy statement damaged the business of data-collection
14
companies such as Source Informatics Ltd. (Source Informatics).
Source Informatics, claiming that the British Department of
Health's policy statement resulted in loss of business, 15 brought
suit against the health authorities, seeking to have the policy
In a short-lived landmark
declared "erroneous in law." 16
17
decision, the trial court agreed with the Department of Health's
policy and denied Source Informatics' request for declaratory

7. R. v. Dep't of Health ex parte Source Informatics Ltd., 4 All E.R. 185, 187 (Q.B.
1999), rev'd, 1 All E.R. 786 (C.A. 2000). The company that prompted the Health
Department's policy statement is not the company that filed the court action. 4 All E.R.
at 187.
8. 4 All E.R. at 187.
9. Id.
10. Id. (emphasis added).
11. Cherry Norton, Sale of Patient Drug Details is Ruled Illegal, THE INDEP.
(London), May 29, 1999, at 10.
12. Source in Court Battle to Keep PrescriptionData,CHEMIST & DRUGGIST, May 22,
1999, at 32.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. See Source Informatics Ltd., 4 All E.R. at 188.
16. Id.
17. Jeremy Clay, Landmark Move on Prescriptions,LEICESTER MERCURY, June 1,
1999, at 26.
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relief (Source ).18
It held that disclosure of anonymous
prescription information under Source Informatics' plan was an
"unauthorised [sic] use by the pharmacist of confidential
20
information" 19 and, thus, a "clear breach of confidence."
In Source I, the court held that express consent is always
necessary for the disclosure of anonymous drug prescription data
to a third party. 21 The ruling created "widespread confusion about
how prescription data can be used legally" 22 causing some
pharmacy chains to stop collecting prescription data from their
branches. 23 As a result, several private British healthcare
organizations and the National Pharmaceutical Association
intervened in Source Informatics' appeal 24 to seek clarification on
how pharmacies may use prescription data to run their business.25
The appellate court reversed the trial court's decision that granted
broad patient privacy rights in situations when the data cannot
identify the patient (Source 1/).26
Like the United Kingdom, the United States recognizes a
right to privacy established by case and statutory law. 27 This right,

however, is not absolute 28 and has not been extended to medical
information revealed to pharmacists, 2 9 nor to non-identifying

medical data. 30

Accordingly, despite U.S. federal and state

attempts to safeguard medical privacy, such protection has only

18. Source Informatics Ltd., 4 All E.R. at 198.
19. Id. at 192.
20. Id.
21. See Source Informatics Ltd., 4 All E.R. at 192-93; see also Lisa Thomlinson &
Abha Thakor, GMC Admits Confidentiality Rules in Doubt, PULSE, July 10, 1999, at 1.
Source Informatics did not contend that a patient gives implied consent to a physician or
pharmacist for the sale of the information to a third party. The court, therefore, did not
consider nor did it find it necessary to consider this possibility. Source Informatics Ltd., 4
All E.R. at 192-93. The trial court, however, recognized that implied consent may exist in
situations where the physicians and pharmacists themselves use the anonymous
information for medical research and advancement. Id.
22. NPA to Intervene in Source Informatics Appeal Court Hearing, CHEMIST &
DRUGGIST, Sept. 25, 1999, at 36.
23. Id.
24. Source Informatics Ltd., 1 All E.R. at 787.
25. NPA to Intervene in Source Informatics Appeal Court Hearing,supra note 22, at
36.
26. 1 All E.R. at 801.
27. See discussion infra Part IV.
28. United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 578 (3d Cir. 1980).
29. Gostin, supra note 3, at 510; Evans v. Rite Aid Corp., 478 S.E.2d 846, 848 (S.C.
1996).
30. See discussion infra Part IV.A.3.
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been afforded to identifiable medical information. 31 Thus, the
laws in the United States expressly permit the use of anonymous
data.32
This Note discusses the United Kingdom's protection of
personal medical information, in light of the Source I and H
decisions and the significance of the United Kingdom's short-lived
attempt to broaden patient's medical privacy rights. In addition, it
analyzes the United States' reluctance to protect patient medical
data from misuse. 33 It argues that medical privacy should protect
patients' records from access by unauthorized third parties, and
give patients a private cause of action when their records are
34
misused without sufficient public policy justifications.
Furthermore, it concludes that an individual's privacy right should
also extend to anonymous medical information. 35 This right to
confidentiality, moreover, should not only pertain to information
revealed to physicians, but to other healthcare professionals, such
36
as pharmacists.
Part II of this Note begins by defining privacy as a right to
autonomy. Part III discusses the Source I and II decisions and
their impact in the United Kingdom. Part IV examines medical
privacy rights in the United States, considers steps that have been
taken to extend those rights, and explores unprotected areas. Part
V establishes that, aside from the Source I case, the limited
medical rights in the United Kingdom and the United States
involve identifiable data, and do not protect anonymous data that
is widely used in medical research. Part VI concludes that in the
absence of important public policy concerns, courts should
recognize that the right to privacy is breached when a health care
professional uses anonymous medical data for purposes for which
the patient did not consent.

31. See discussion infra Part IV.
32. See id.
33. See Michael P. Roch, Filling the Void of Data Protection in the United States:
Following the European Example, 12 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 71,
88 (1996).
34. See discussion infra Part VI.
35. Id.
36. Id.
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II. THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
"Privacy is not simply an absence of information about us in
the minds of others; rather it is the control we have over
information about ourselves." 37 Privacy, therefore, is not simply
the protection of identity-it is a person's ability to control access
to information about oneself. 38 Privacy is required to ensure an
individual's sense of respect, love, friendship, and, most important
39
to the purpose of this Note, trust.
Because an individual's medical records are "intensely
personal, ' 40 when a patient gives prescription information to a
pharmacist and is unable to control how the information, albeit
anonymous, is used, that patient's sense of privacy is invaded. The
patient lost the "ability to retain autonomous decision-making
authority" over the use of the data. 41 The patient permitted the
information to be used only to fill a prescription, not to aid
pharmaceutical companies in marketing drugs. 42 Because privacy
is the right to control information, 43 a patient should not lose that
right simply because the information is made anonymous.
III. A SHORT

WINDOW OF SUBSTANTIAL PATIENT PRIVACY IN THE
UNITED KINGDOM

A. An Analysis of The Lower Court'sDecision in Source I
In Source I, the trial court created a private cause of action for
breach of confidence against pharmacists and physicians who
disclose medical records to private companies for commercial

37. Fried, supra note 1, at 482.
38. Id.; Lawrence 0. Gostin et al., Privacy and Security of Health Information in the
Emerging Health Care System, 5 HEALTH MATRIX 1, 3 (1995) ("[P]rivacy rights are widely
understood as the right of an individual to limit access by others to some aspect of the
person.").
39. Fried, supra note 1, at 477-83. Trust is important because the court in Source I
based its holding on the principle that a patient must be able to maintain trust in the
healthcare provider. R. v. Dep't of Health ex parte Source Informatics Ltd., 4 All E.R.
185, 195-96 (Q.B. 1999), rev'd, 1 All E.R. 786 (C.A. 2000).
40. David L. Wheeler, Is the Loss of PersonalPrivacy the Price of Medical Progress?,
THE CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Sept. 17, 1999, at A21.

41. Gostin et al., supra note 38, at 20.
42. R. v. Dep't of Health ex parte Source Informatics Ltd., 4 All E.R. 185, 189 (Q.B.
1999), rev'd, 1 All E.R. 786 (C.A. 2000).
43. Fried, supra note 1, at 483.
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use. 44 The ruling was a surprise because the United Kingdom has
45
been slow to protect its citizens' privacy.
Until the Source I ruling, the healthcare community believed
that removing all identifying patient information satisfied the legal
requirements for confidentiality. 46
Companies like Source
Informatics believed they could collect anonymous prescription
data from pharmacists by downloading it into a database without
risking breach of confidentiality liability. 47 The data included the
name of the physician as well as the identity and quantity of the
prescribed drugs, but did not include any information that
identified the patient. 48 Source Informatics sold the data to
pharmaceutical companies who, in turn, used the database to
49
target physicians with promotions and products.
Additionally, physicians were able to disclose anonymous
records to third parties. Shortly before the ruling in Source I, the
General Medical Council (GMC) drafted policy guidelines that
allowed British physicians to obtain implied consent from patients
to disclose records for financial and clinical audit, post-payment
verification, and medical research by placing posters and leaflets in
the waiting room. 50 The guidelines were based on the view that
information that is anonymous and aggregated could be used
without raising a question of confidentiality. 51 Some scholars,
however, asserted that "[s]imply putting a sign up in the pharmacy
saying that information might be passed on [to others] would not
count as having informed consent . -52 Following Source I, on
the advice of the Queen's Counsel that the guidelines would

44. Source Informatics Ltd., 4 All E.R. at 198.
45. See Sir Thomas Bingham, It's the Tort that Counts, THE OBSERVER, May 27, 1996,
at T16 (noting that in the United Kingdom, there is "no recognition of a general right to
privacy.").
46. In the News this Montk In the Pharmacy World, COMMUNITY PHARMACY, July
1999, at 3 [hereinafter Pharmacy World].
47. R. v. Dep't of Health ex parte Source Informatics Ltd., 1 All E.R. 786, 788 (C.A.
2000), rev'g 4 All E.R. 185, 187 (Q.B. 1999). Source Informatics paid for this prescription
information by donating a nominal fee to a charity of the pharmacist's choice. 1 All E.R.
at 788.
48. Prescription Information Remains Confidential, THE TIMES (London), June 14,
1999, at 45.
49. Source in Court Battle to Keep PrescriptionData,supra note 12, at 32.
50. Thomlinson & Thakor, supra note 21, at 1.
51. Linda Beecham, Medicopolitical Digest: GMC Delays Guidelines on
Confidentiality, BRIT. MED. J.,
Sept. 25, 1999, at 858.
52. Make Sure of Security Needs, CHEMIST & DRUGGIST, Sept. 25, 1999, at 21.
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violate the court's ruling, the GMC decided to postpone the
publication of its guidelines pending the result of Source
53
Informatics' appeal.
1. Non-Identifying Information Was Held to Be Confidential
After its unsuccessful attempt to persuade the Department of
Health to change its policy, 54 Source Informatics asked the trial
court (Source 1) to declare: 1) that the guidance contained in the
policy document was erroneous in law and 2) that anonymous
and pharmacists to a third
information disclosed by physicians
55
party is not a breach of confidence.
The trial court defined breach of confidence as: (1) the
disclosure of confidential information that is inaccessible to the
public, (2) under circumstances that impose an obligation on the
recipient to respect the confidentiality of the information and (3)
that is breached by the recipient. 56 In Source I, the court agreed
with the Department of Health that when a patient explicitly or
implicitly gives medical information for a limited purpose, this
consent imposes upon the recipient a duty to refrain from using
the information for any other purpose. 57 The duty applies not only
to the recipient, but also to any third party that receives the
information thereafter. 58 A patient can show a breach of duty by
demonstrating that the recipient made an unauthorized use of the
59
information for a purpose other than that for which it was given.
Source I centered on two issues. First, whether the disclosure
of non-identifying information to a third party is an unauthorized
use of the data, which would satisfy the third element for breach of

53. Beecham, supra note 51, at 858.
54. R. v. Dep't of Health ex parte Source Informatics Ltd., 4 All E.R. 185, 188 (Q.B.
1999), rev'd, 1 All E.R. 786 (C.A. 2000).
55. 4 All E.R. at 188.
56. Id. at 190-91 (citing FRANCIS GURRY, BREACH OF CONFIDENCE 3-5 (1984)). In
this case, the authorized recipients of the patient information are physicians and
pharmacists. See generally id.
57. Id. at 190 (citing GURRY, supra note 56, at 3).
58. Id. Therefore, a data collection company that obtains medical information from a
physician or pharmacist, who breached the duty to a patient, will itself be in breach.
Hence, both the healthcare providers and the data collection company could be sued for
breach of the duty of confidence. See id.
59. Id. at 190-91.
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confidence. 60 Second, whether a patient must show detriment to
61
state a cause of action.
Source Informatics argued that the disclosure of anonymous
data to third parties is not a breach of confidence because the data
loses its confidential nature when the individual's identifying
information is removed. 62 According to Source Informatics, only
use of information containing identifying data amounts to breach
of confidence. 63 It argued that because the company uses the data
only after it becomes anonymous, at which point it loses its
64
confidential character, the patient's confidence is not breached.
The trial court, however, rejected Source Informatics' suggestion
that the process of disclosing information can be divided into two
stages: (1) making the information anonymous and thus nonconfidential and then (2) using the data. 65 Instead, according to
the trial court, the disclosure of patient medical data immediately
becomes a "clear breach of confidence unless the patient gives
consent."' 66 Therefore, the Source I court held that pharmacists
who disclose any data without the patient's consent would expose
67
themselves to successful actions for breach of confidentiality.
2. Disclosure of Anonymous Data Was Held to Be Detrimental as
a Matter of Public Policy
The Source I court then considered whether detriment is a
necessary element of breach of confidentiality and, if so, what type
of unauthorized use of the information is detrimental to the
68
patient.
The court first determined that detriment remains a necessary
part of breach of confidence. 69 Breach of a patient's confidence
may be defined as the loss of privacy when "others obtain
information about an individual, pay attention to him[,] or gain
access to him." 70 Under this definition, an individual patient

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

See id. at 192.
See id. at 192-94.
Id. at 192.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 197.
Id. at 191,193-94.
See id. at 194.
Id. at 195.
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would not suffer detriment from the use of anonymous data. 71
While most patients would not be concerned that statistical
information is extracted from their prescription records, 72 for
others, any non-consensual use of their records is
unconscionable. 73 Accordingly, because pharmacists provide a
service to the general public and must retain its trust, 74 the trial
court found that it is in the public interest to keep such
information private so that no patients are inhibited from seeking
medical care. 75 Therefore, a pharmacist who breaches the
patient's confidence by publicizing anonymous data might cause
76
enough detriment to justify a remedy.
The trial court noted, however, that its decision might not
apply when a sufficient public interest exists so as to justify making
77
the information available to others without the patients' consent.
But Source Informatics did not argue that the public would benefit
from the sale of the prescription data. 78 Nor did it argue that the
patients gave the health care providers their implied consent, as
may be the case when physicians use anonymous information for
"research, medical advancement, or the proper administration of
the service." 79 Instead, it argued that the anonymous information
has commercial value. The trial court did not find this argument
persuasive enough to overcome the public interest in the
80
protection of confidence.
The Department of Health, on the other hand, argued that
the unauthorized use would not advance the public interest. 81 It
claimed that the sale would inhibit patients who greatly value their
privacy from seeking medical assistance if they feared that

71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 196.
75. Id. (finding, however, that a breach of confidence may be acceptable if it is in the
public interest).
76. Id. at 197 (stating that "breach of confidence in itself might carry with it sufficient
detriment to justify the grant of a remedy."). See also id. at 196-97 (citing X v. Y, 2 All
E.R. 648, 657-58 (Q.B. 1988) (holding that detriment in the use of information in a way
that does not identify the patient or the health care provider does not preclude legal
relief)).
77. Id. at 196
78. Id.
79. Id. at 192.
80. Id. at 196.
81. Id.
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pharmacists would make their data available to unauthorized
parties; Judge Latham accepted this argument. 82 In addition, the
Department of Health suggested that the data obtained by Source
Informatics and used by pharmaceutical companies for target
marketing would affect the prescribing habits of physicians and
substantially increase the costs of health care. 83
B. Losing Confidentiality Rights and Returning to the Past: The
Court of Appeals Allows the Sale of UnauthorizedAnonymous
Information
As a result of the decision in Source I and the Department of
Health's policy that the use of anonymous data would not obviate
a breach of confidence, 84 for a brief period of time privacy rights in
the United Kingdom expanded. To avoid an action for breach of
confidence, physicians and pharmacists were required to obtain
85
patient consent.
When the Department of Health issued its policy statement, it
recognized that the public interest in disclosure could outweigh the
privacy interest of the patient, but doubted that use of medical
data for pecuniary purposes would be in the public interest. 86 It
suggested, instead, that such disclosure would be directly contrary
to public interest. 87 The trial court accepted the Department's
argument when it found that the patient's data must be protected
to guard the public's trust in the profession. 88
On appeal, however, the Source II court rejected the
Department's argument and reversed the trial court's ruling. 89 It
found that the general duty of confidence does not prevent
pharmacists from selling data in any way they find conscionable so

82. Id.
83. R. v. Dep't of Health ex parte Source Informatics Ltd., 1 All E.R. 786, 789 (C.A
2000) rev'g 4 All E.R. 185 (Q.B. 1999).
84. Source Informatics Ltd., 4 All E.R. at 187.
85. Id. at 192.
86. Id. at 187.
87. Source Informatics Ltd., 1 All E.R. at 789.
88. Source Informatics Ltd., 4 All E.R. at 196. The appellate court, however, noted
that the Department of Health was primarily concerned with potential rise in medical
costs due to use of the data to market prescription drugs. Source Informatics Ltd., 1 All
E.R. at 789.
89. Source Informatics Ltd., 1 All E.R. at 797 (holding that the pharmacist's duty of
confidence is not breached by the sale of the anonymous data).
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long as the patients' anonymity is fully protected. 90 This holds true
regardless of whether the patient would object to such use.
In Source II, the court accepted the trial court's definition of

breach of confidence as consisting of three elements. 91 The
information must: (1) have an element of confidence, (2) be
obtained under circumstances requiring that confidence be kept,
92
and (3) be used without authority to the detriment of the patient.

Nevertheless, unlike the trial court, the court of appeals struck
down the Department's policy, finding that the third element was

not satisfied. 93 The appellate court dismissed as "unreal" the
Department's argument that the information was disclosed to a
pharmacist only for the limited purpose of dispensing drugs and

that any other use of it, even if kept anonymous, is an
objectionable misuse. 94

It reasoned that because the patient's

autonomy to protect his or her identity forms the basis for the
patient's interest in the information, the use of the prescription
information in a manner that protects the patient's identity would
not undermine that patient's interest. 95 Thus, in Source II, the

appellate court rejected the trial court's finding that the public's
distrust of the medical profession for selling anonymous patient
data for commercial gain to be a sufficient detriment to the
patient.9 6 It held that there could be no detriment absent the
actual disclosure of the identity of the patient. 9 7 The fact that a
reasonable person would believe that the information is given in

confidence is sufficient to create a duty of privacy, but is not
98
sufficient to prohibit all manners of use of that information.

90. Id. at 796-97 ("[T]he confidant is placed under a duty of good faith to the confider
and the touchstone by which to judge the scope of his duty and whether or not it has been
fulfilled or breached is his own conscience, no more and no less.") (emphasis added).
91. See id. at 790. For a general discussion by the trial court of the three elements see
Source Informatics Ltd., 4 All E.R. at 190-91.
92. Source Informatics Ltd., 1 All E.R. at 790 (analyzing the issue of detriment, as
discussed by the trial court, as part of the third element).
93. Id. at 797 (finding that the patient's integrity is not undermined when the data is
sold to an unauthorized third party).
94. Id. at 796.
95. Id. at 797.
96. See id. at 796-97 (holding that the issue is not of detriment, but whether a
reasonable pharmacist would find the particular use of the data objectionable).
97. Id. ("[11n a case involving personal confidences[,] I would hold . . . that the
confidence is not breached where the confider's identity is protected.").
9& Id. at 793 (citing Smith Kline & French Labs. (Austl.) Ltd. v. Sec'y to the Dep't of
Cmty. Servs. and Health (1991) 99 A.L.R. 679,691-92. (quoting Moorgate Tobacco Co. v.
Phillip Morris Ltd. 56 A.L.R. 193, 203 (1984) (holding that the obligation to maintain
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Accordingly, if the information is rendered anonymous, the
patient will not suffer any detriment upon disclosure and therefore
breach of privacy even when the information is
cannot sue for
99
made public.
According to the appellate court, the test for determining
whether the use of confidential information violates the patient's
right to privacy is whether "a reasonable pharmacist's conscience
[would] be troubled by the proposed use to be made of the
patient's prescription." 100 Therefore, the appellate court's test is
an objective, physician-centered test, rather than the trial court's
subjective, patient-centered test. 101 Unlike the trial court, the
appellate court was not concerned with whether the patient would
distrust the medical community, nor that the pharmacist has a duty
to use private prescription information exclusively for the purpose
of dispensing drugs. 10 2 As long as a reasonable pharmacist would
not be troubled by the release of the information to 10a3 data
collection company, the duty of confidence is not breached.
The appellate court specifically held that a patient has no
privacy rights when medical data is anonymous, even in the
absence of any policy interest to make such data available. 10 4 The
court presumed that privacy could be guaranteed by the data
collection company. 10 5 The appellate court reasoned that as long
as the patient is ensured anonymity, the patient has no property
interest or proprietary claim in the prescription information, and
thus has no right to control its use.106

confidences "lies in the notion of an obligation of conscience arising from the
circumstances in or through which the information was communicated or obtained"))).
99. 1 All E.R. at 797.
100. Id. at 796.
101. This suggests that regardless of whether a policy exists for making the data public,
a patient who is troubled by such use has no cause of action for breach of confidence.
102. See 1 All E.R. at 797.
103. Id.
104. Id. (holding that the patient has no right to control the use of medical data as long
as his or her identity is not revealed).
105. Id. at 789.
106. Id. at 797.
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C. A Patient Who is Denied Privacy Rights in Anonymous Data is
Susceptible to SubstantialInvasion by the Medical Community
The medical community makes substantial use of anonymous
medical data. 10 7 Several countries, including the United Kingdom,
have fashioned policies regarding the right of medical
professionals to sell or provide patients' medical records to third
parties. 10 8 For example, in Iceland, the Parliament granted a U.S.
biotechnology company based in Delaware an exclusive license to
build an electronic database of the country's medical records,
10 9
including diagnoses, test results, treatments, and side effects.
The company used the information along with genetic and
genealogical data for commercial purposes, 110 entering into a nonexclusive agreement with Hoffman-La-Roche, Inc., 11l that
to
provides access to the database, and allows Hoffman-La-Roche 112
research the genetic origins of twelve common diseases.
Although Icelanders may exclude themselves from the database at
any time, there is concern that the average Icelander may not be
113
aware of all potential present and future uses of the database.
Iceland exemplifies the lack of medical privacy that residents of
many countries face.
As a result of the ruling in Source II, British healthcare
professionals can use anonymous data, including genetic data, in a
manner comparable to that in Iceland. 114 Such broad use of
anonymous medical information would be upheld under the
appellate court's standard if a medical professional would not find

107. E.g., Wheeler, supra note 40, at A21 (stating that medical knowledge comes
largely from the study of medical records, including anonymous records).
108. See, e.g., Ontario Pharmacists Can Sell Information, Body Says (Ontario College
of Pharmacists), CANADIAN PRESS NEWSWIRE, May 9, 1996, available at LEXIS, News
Library, Allnws File (stating that the governing body for Ontario's pharmacists allows its
members to sell the anonymous prescription information, although the national
association for pharmacists' code of ethics condemned the practice and was protested by
Ontario doctors).
109. Ruth Chadwick, The Icelandic Database-Do Modern Times Need Modern
Sagas?, 319 BRIT. MED. J. 441,441 (1999).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at443.
114. See R. v. Dep't of Health ex parte Source Informatics Ltd., 1 All E.R. 786, 786,
797 (C.A. 2000), rev'g 4 All E.R. 185 (Q.B. 1999).
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such use unconscionable. 115 The general public, however, finds
such use of anonymous medical data reprehensible. 116 For
instance, in a 2000 U.S. Gallup Poll, ninety-three percent of
allowed to
persons polled indicated that researchers should not be 117
study genetic information without the patient's consent.
IV. THE

UNITED STATES AFFORDS LIMITED PRIVACY

PROTECTIONS

A. Federal Law ProvidesInsufficient Protectionof Medical Data
Privacy
Currently, U.S. residents have never been more sensitive
about their privacy rights nor more aware of the potential for
abuse of their private information. 118 Disclosure of health records,
which contain substantial private information, including financial
and employment data, indications of disabilities, problems with
mental health, and history of disease, as well as sexual and lifestyle
information, 119 could result in patient stigmatization, thus
discouraging many from divulging sensitive information to their
healthcare providers. 120 Accordingly, without adequate privacy
protections, patients may lose trust in the medical profession,
121
leaving the integrity of the healthcare system as a whole at risk.
1. The U.S. Courts Recognize a Constitutional Right to Privacy
In Olmstead v. United States,122 Justice Brandeis first
articulated that the U.S. Constitution protects the right to be let
alone as "the most comprehensive of rights and the right most

115. See 1 All E.R. at 796.
116. See generally THE GALLUP ORGANIZATION, PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD
MEDICAL PRIVACY (2000), http://www.forhealthfreedom.org/Gallupsurvey/ (last visited
Jan. 1,2001).
117. Id. at 4. The question posed was: "Should medical and government RESEARCHERS
be allowed to STUDY your genetic information (forexample, to identify genes thought to be
associated with various medical conditions) without first obtaining your permission, or do
you feel they should first obtain your permission?" Id. at 17.
118. Paul A. Lombardo, Genetic Confidentiality: What's the Big Secret?, 3 U. CHI. L.
SCH. ROUNDTABLE 589, 589 (1996).
119. Gostin, supra note 3, at 490.
120. Id. at 490-91.
121. Id. at 490.
122. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
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valued by civilized men." 123 Since then, U.S. courts have
recognized that the right to privacy is one of the most
"fundamental and cherished rights." 124 The right to privacy
includes the individual interest in avoiding unconsented disclosure
of personal information. 125
The collection, recording, and
dissemination of individualized medical information threatens that
right. 126 Consequently, much of the public, congressional, and
judicial concern has been with governmental accumulation of
medical information and its use in ways that may be detrimental to
127
individual privacy.
2. Federal Case Laws Limit the Right to Privacy
The constitutional right to privacy is not absolute. 128 The
U.S. Supreme Court has not formulated a general approach to
identifying justifiable privacy rights. 129 Once specific rights are
recognized, the Court weighs the individual's recognized privacy
interests against the state's interest to determine whether to
provide protection. 130 The Supreme Court, therefore, has limited
the federal constitutional protection of privacy interests by
balancing them against the government's interests. 131
In United States v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.,132 the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals identified seven factors that a court must
consider in determining whether the right of personal privacy
outweighs the public interest in accessing the information in the
context of medical data privacy: (1) the type of records requested;
(2) the information the records have or might contain; (3) the
safeguards available to prevent subsequent disclosures to others;
(4) the potential of harm that subsequent unauthorized disclosure
would have; (5) the injury that the disclosure would have on the
relationship that compiled the information; (6) the degree of need

123. Id. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
124. E.g., United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 576 (3rd Cir. 1980).
125. Id. at 577.
126. Id. at 576-77.
127. Id. at 576.
128. Id. at 578.
129. Susan Clement et al., Note, The Evolution of the Right to Privacy After Roe v.
Wade, 13 AM. J.L. & MED. 368, 381 (1987).
130. Id.
131. Gostin, supra note 3, at 495.
132. Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 578.
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for access; and (7) the existence of a recognizable public interest in
the information. 133
In Westinghouse, the Third Circuit allowed a government
agency that was responsible for establishing occupational safety
and health standards to subpoena Westinghouse's employees'
medical records. 134 Although the court recognized that an
employee's medical records are entitled to protection, 135 when the
societal benefit in disclosure outweighs the privacy interest,
disclosure may be compelled. 136 The court found that the societal
interest in protecting the health of employees and the public at
large from toxic exposure was substantial. 137 Most significantly,
rather than presuming that such intrusion into employee privacy is
severe or could harm employee interests, the court placed the
evidentiary burden on the company claiming invasion of
privacy. 138 A person who wants to avoid disclosure of personal
medical information, therefore, has the burden to show that the
information should not be disclosed.
Even when the public interest outweighs the right of privacy,
disclosure of medical records would be improper if the
government lacks "effective provisions for security of the
information against subsequent unauthorized disclosure.' ' 139 The
threshold of "effective" security, however, is not strict. Relying on
earlier cases, the Third Circuit noted that it is sufficient that the
government has "adequate" provisions in place to secure the
140
privacy of the information from further unauthorized disclosure.
The precautions must be substantial but "not foolproof. ' 141 The
133. Id.
134. Id. at 570. Westinghouse was under investigation for exposing its employees to
significant levels of toxic materials, which caused allergic reactions in some employees. Id.
at 572.
135. Id. at 577 ("There can be no question that an employee's medical records, which
may contain intimate facts of a personal nature, are well within the ambit of materials
entitled to privacy protection.").
136. Id. at 578.
137. Id. at 579.
138. See id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 580 (citing Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977) (permitting the state to
compile database of names and addresses of patients who obtained by prescription certain
legal drugs for which there is also an illegal market); Schachter v. Whalen, 581 F.2d 35 (2d
Cir. 1978) (validating the constitutionality of a New York statute allowing the Executive
Secretary of New York State Board for Professional Medical Conduct the power to
subpoena private patient information, despite the patient's opposition)).
141. Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 580 (citing Schachter, 581 F.2d at 37 n.2).
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court nonetheless did not discuss what minimal provisions are
adequate to ensure confidentiality.
These cases, which provide patients with some medical
privacy, dealt only with government's intent to obtain confidential
information about identifiable persons. When the information is
collected and published in statistical form such that the person
cannot be identified, the constitutional right of privacy is not
142
implicated.
3. Federal Privacy Statutes Do Not Protect Unconsented Use of
Anonymous Data
In addition to privacy protections afforded by case law,
federal statutes provide limited protection against the intrusion
into patients' records held by the government. For example, the
Freedom of Information Act 143 (FOIA) requires federal agencies
to release requested information held in government files, unless
the information consists of medical records. 144 The statute
requires that all records of federal agencies be made accessible to
the public and places the burden on the agency to show that the
documents should not be released. 145 The FOIA further requires
a government agency to permit public access to any portion of an
open meeting. 146 To protect private records from public scrutiny,
the Act contains nine exemptions. 147 One of the exemptions has
148
been used to prevent public access to personal medical records.
But the U.S. Supreme Court held that a federal agency that

142. United States v. Little, 321 F. Supp. 388, 392 (D. Del. 1971).
143. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994).
144. See id. at § 552b(b)-(c).
145. See Jean F. Rydstorm, Annotation, Scope of Judicial Review Under Freedom of
Information Act (5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)), of Administrative Agency's Withholding of
Records, 7 A.L.R. FED. 876, 881 (1971). In practice, though, courts often require the party
seeking disclosure to present some evidence that the agency is improperly withholding the
documents sought, before shifting the burden to the agency. Id.
146. Freedom of Information Act § 552b(b) ("[E]very portion of every meeting of an
agency shall be open to public observation.").
147. Id. § 552b(c)(1)-(10)
148. Id. § 552(b)(6) (exempting any government records from disclosure that contain
"personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a
clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy"); see also E.E. Mazier, Local Agencies
Must Disclose Redacted Versions of Federal Housing Assistance Contracts, NEW JERSEY
LAW., July 8, 1996, at 32 (noting that the exemption applies to medical records).
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merely has the discretion, not the duty, to
maintains records 149
withhold disclosure.
The Privacy Act of 1974150 (Privacy Act) provides no more
privacy protection for individuals about whom the government
collects data than does the FOIA. 151 Congress enacted the Privacy
Act simply to ensure that federal agencies use fair information
practices in collecting, using, or disseminating records, 152 and
specifically to protect "medical history" records. 153 It was not
intended to interfere with the right of the public to obtain
information contained in federal agency records. 154 Under the
Privacy Act, agencies cannot disclose any information to other
agencies or individuals without the person's consent. 155 That
restriction, however, is subject to several rather broad
exceptions. 156 These exceptions include allowing disclosure: (1) to
other agency employees who need the record for the performance
of their duties or for routine use, (2) to a person showing
compelling circumstances involving health or safety, or (3) to a
consumer reporting agency. 157 Moreover, any recipient may
obtain information if sought for statistical research and the record
is not identifiable.158 Like FOIA, there is no invasion of privacy if
identifying characteristics. 159
the collector deletes any
Furthermore, the Privacy Act does not160 affect most non-federal
agencies that collect health information.
Evidently, Congress is less concerned with anonymous
medical information because once the data has been stripped of all
identifying information, it leaves no means to associate the
information with a specific patient, and therefore poses the fewest
privacy concerns. 161 Such data, however, does have the potential

149. Gostin, supra note 3, at 502-03, (citing Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281,293
(1979) ("Congress did not design the FOIA exemptions to be mandatory bars to
disclosure.")).
150. Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1974).
151. See Gostin, supra note 3, at 500-01.
152. Id. at 499-500.
153. Privacy Act of 1974 § 552a(a)(4).
154. Gostin, supra note 3, at 501.
155. Privacy Act of 1974 § 552a(b).
156. Id.
157. Id. § 552a(b)(1)-(12); see also Gostin, supra note 3, at 500 n.224.
158. Gostin, supra note 3, at 500 n.224.
159. Dep't of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 381 (1976).
160. Gostin, supra note 3, at 500-01.
161. Id. at 519.

2001]

Medical Privacy Rights in Anonymous Data

of identifying a racial or ethnic group and painting it in an
162
offensive or misleading light.
Additionally, although the U.S. federal government provides
more stringent confidentiality standards for drug and alcohol
treatment records, 163 even those do not provide adequate
protection. For example, while records of federally funded drug or
alcohol treatment facilities usually may only be disclosed with the
patient's consent, consent is not required for medical research
purposes. 164 In addition, medical records in non-federally funded
165
facilities are not protected.
B. State-Recognized Right of Privacy Does Not Protect
Anonymous Data
1. State Statutes Provide Limited Protection of Medical Data
166
As U.S. federal privacy laws do not affect private actions,
Congress left the states to provide protection from private
actors. 167 State laws protecting the privacy of medical information
vary and contain numerous exceptions, yet the effectiveness of
168
laws in protecting medical information in practice is unknown.
Laws protecting the confidentiality of genetic information are an
169
example.
In Colorado, information derived from genetic testing is
privileged and cannot be released to unauthorized parties without
the written consent of the test subject. 170 The law, however,
provides numerous exceptions, including allowing the release of
anonymous information to research facilities. 171 In Georgia,
genetic information for civil use is the unique property of the

162. Id. at 520-21 (noting that data indicating a disproportionately high rate of HIV
infection, mental illness, or alcoholism in discrete populations may lead to adverse
effects).
163. Gostin, supra note 3, at 503.
164. Id. at 503 n.254.
165. Id. at 503.
166. Christina M. Rackett, Note, Telemedicine Today and Tomorrow: Why "Virtual"
Privacy is Not Enough, 25 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 167, 181 (1997).
167. Id.
168. Lombardo, supra note 118, at 589.
169. See GA. CODE ANN. § 33-54-1 (1996); COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-3-1104.7 (1994).
170. COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-3-1104.7(3)(a); see Lombardo,supra note 118, at 604.
171. COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-3-1104.7(5); see Lombardo, supra note 118, at 604.
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patient. 172 The law, however, explicitly allows use of information
derived from genetic testing for scientific research without the
patient's consent as long as the patient's identity is not disclosed to
third parties. 173 Some states provide disease-specific privacy
protection, such as statutes that protect the privacy of people with
HIV. 174 Some of these statutes give near-absolute protection and
prohibit any disclosure without the patient's consent. 175 Other
states, however, provide many exceptions in favor of disclosure,
176
which greatly dilute patients' privacy rights.
2. Limited Protection for Identifiable Information: U.S. Tort and
Contract Case Law
In absence of a statute mandating or permitting disclosure,
tort and contract law provides patients with limited privacy
protection. 177 Recent case law protects various "reasonable
expectation[s] of privacy" from unexpected intrusion. 178 U.S.
courts, however, have failed to provide substantial protection for
the confidentiality of patients' medical records. State courts
provide some protection by recognizing a duty of privacy and of
179
confidentiality in tort as well as a contractual duty of privacy.
These duties, however, have been applied primarily to physicians
and similar health-care providers, 180 not to pharmacists.181
The Restatement (Second) of Torts section 652D describes an
invasion of privacy as publicizing "a matter concerning the private
life of another" 182 that "(a) would be highly offensive to a
reasonable person, and (b) is not of legitimate concern to the
public."'183 According to the Restatement, there is no invasion of
privacy if the information was communicated to a specific small
172. GA. CODE ANN. § 33-54-1(1); see Lombardo, supra note 118, at 605.
173. Lombardo, supra note 118, at 605 (leading the federal commission to endorse
special treatment for AIDS-related medical information).
174. Id. at 592.
175. See id.
176. Gostin, supra note 3, at 508.
177. Roch, supra note 33, at 92-93.
178. See, e.g., Sanders v. Am. Broad. Cos., 20 Cal. 4th 907 (1999) (protecting
conversations between employees in an employees-only area of an office from secret
videotaping).
179. Gostin, supra note 3, at 508-09.
180. See id. at 509.
181. Evans v. Rite Aid Corp., 478 S.E.2d 846,848 (S.C. 1996).
182. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977).
183. Id. § 652D(a)-(b).
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group, rather than the general public. 184 Some courts, however,
have declined to follow the Restatement's limited application of
the tort and, instead, broadened the tort's application. 185 Other
courts rely on the state constitutional right of privacy for
protection against physicians who make unauthorized disclosure of
186
medical conditions.
In addition, most states recognize a common law duty of
confidentiality arising out of professional relationship 187 as applied
to health care providers. 188 Thus, when a patient reasonably
believes that information divulged is private, a physician may be
liable for disclosure without the patient's consent or a valid
justification. 189 The reasoning is that "[a] patient should be
entitled to freely disclose his symptoms and condition to his doctor
in order to receive proper treatment without fear that those facts
may become public property. Only thus can the purpose of the
relationship be fulfilled." 190 Accordingly, state courts have found
a breach of confidentiality when physicians disclose information
obtained from a therapeutic relationship to employers or family
members. 191 For example, In Estate of Behringer v. Medical
Center at Princeton,192 a hospital violated its duty of confidentiality
when it did not take reasonable precautions to prevent the identity
of a physician who contracted HIV from becoming known to his
associates and patients. 193 The court reasoned that failure to take
such precautions could amount to negligence. 194 A physician may
not disclose information obtained during medical visitation unless

184. Id. § 652D cmt. a.
185. See, e.g., Horne v. Patton, 287 So. 2d 824, 827-30 (Ala. 1973) (holding that a
physician may be liable for breach of duty of privacy when disclosing information to the
patient's employer without authorization).
186. See, e.g., Urbaniak v. Newton, 277 Cal. Rptr. 354 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
187. See Albert v. Devine, 479 N.E.2d 113, 120 (Mass. 1985); see also Chizmar v.
Mackie, 896 P.2d 196, 207 (Alaska 1995) (discussing confidentiality asa duty of privacy
arising out of a specific fiduciary relationship).
188. Gostin, supra note 3, at 508.
189. Id.
190. Hague v. Williams, 181 A.2d 345,349 (N.J. 1962).
191. Gostin, supra note 3, at 509. But see Chizmar, 896 P.2d at 214 (holding that a
physician was not liable for breach of duty of confidentiality when he reported the
patient's HIV diagnosis to her husband before consulting with her because it was justified
given the particular facts of the case).
192. 592 A.2d 1251 (N.J. 1991).
193. Id. at 1273-74.
194. Id. at 1272.
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otherwise required by law or to protect the welfare of an
195
individual or society.
Courts also recognize a physician's contractual obligation to
keep patients' information confidential. 196 Breach of contract
amounts to breach of confidentiality or of privacy when the action
involves disclosure of information "relating to the patient's mental
'197
or physical condition or the physician's diagnosis or treatment.
In Geisberger v. Willuhn, 198 a patient sued his physician for breach
of contract when the physician's employee disclosed the patient's
identity as a possible suspect of an armed robbery. 199 The court
held that while a patient may sue for breach of contract, the
physician did not breach his contractual duty to the patient
because the disclosed information did not relate to the200patient's
mental or physical condition or the physician's diagnosis.
Despite the tort and contract theories available to protect a
patient's medical information held by physicians, "it is at best
uncertain whether a duty of confidentiality extends to other health
care professionals [and] researchers ... although the risk of harm
from disclosure is just as significant."' 20 1 Apparently, the duty to
protect the patient's privacy is limited to certain healthcare
providers. Courts refuse to recognize a tort based on breach of
confidentiality or any contract theories or duties 202 when a patient
20 3
divulges personal medical information to a pharmacist.
In Evans v. Rite Aid Corp.,204 the plaintiff submitted a drug
prescription to the defendant pharmacy and later discovered that a
pharmacy employee falsely reported to others that the prescription
was for medication for venereal disease. 20 5 The plaintiff claimed
that a duty of confidence was created by statute, as well as by
ethical mandate of the profession. 20 6 The South Carolina Supreme
195. Id. at 1268.
196. Horne v. Patton, 287 So. 2d 824, 831-32 (Ala. 1973); see also Albert v. Devine, 479
N.E.2d 113, 120 (Mass. 1985) (holding that a duty of confidentiality arises out of a
physician-patient relationship, which creates a contractual obligation).
197. Geisberger v. Willuhn, 390 N.E.2d 945,948 (I11.App. Ct. 1979).
198. Id.
199. Id. at 946.
200. Id. at 948.
201. Gostin, supra note 3, at 510.
202. Suarez v. Pierard, 663 N.E.2d 1039, 1042-44 (I11.App. Ct. 1996).
203. Evans v. Rite Aid Corp., 478 S.E.2d 846, 848 (S.C. 1996).
204. Id. at 846.
205. Id. at 847.
206. Id.
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Court, affirming the trial court's dismissal of plaintiff's claim, 20 7
refused to recognize a common law duty of confidentiality
between pharmacists and patients, 20 8 stating, "[n]o [state court]
has ever recognized such a duty, nor are we aware of any other
jurisdiction that has done so."209
In Suarez v. Pierard,210 an Illinois appellate court held that a
pharmacist's advice and information about the use of drugs does
not establish a confidential therapeutic relationship with a patient,
nor a contractual duty to protect the patient's privacy, in the
211
absence of showing that the pharmacist was unjustly enriched.
In that case, the plaintiff had a prescription filled at a K-Mart
pharmacy for drugs used in the treatment of mental health
disorders. 212 The plaintiff disclosed confidential information to
the pharmacist on duty. 213 Later, at a chance meeting with the
plaintiff in a bar, the pharmacist discussed confidential information
regarding her treatment in the presence of others. 214 The plaintiff,
embarrassed and humiliated, sued for a breach of duty created by
216
the state's Confidentiality Act 215 and by implied contract.
The Suarez court first held that the Confidentiality Act does
not protect a "routine transaction with a pharmacist, even where..
the pharmacist questions plaintiff about her treatment and
medical condition." 2 17 The pharmacist's role "is largely limited to
filling the prescription as ordered by the physician ... providing a

product to a customer, not providing mental health services to a
patient. '218 "Regardless of how broadly one construes the [state's]
Confidentiality Act, the facts alleged here simply fail to state a
cause of action [for breach of confidentiality]. 219
The plaintiff's claim that she "entered into an implied
contract whereby it was 'assumed and understood' that the
207. Id.
208. Id. at 848.
209. Id.
210. Suarez v. Pierard, 663 N.E.2d 1039 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996).
211. Id. at 1042-44.
212. Id. at 1041.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Mental Health
and Developmental
Disabilities
(Confidentiality Act) 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 110/1-17 (2000).
216. Suarez, 663 N.E.2d at 1041.
217. Id. at 1042.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 1043.

Confidentiality

Act

Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 23:41

information obtained by [the pharmacist] was confidential and
would not be disclosed, '220 was summarily rejected. 221 The court
refused to acknowledge that such a duty could have been implied
2 22
from the facts or law.

In summary, state case law protects patients' privacy against
disclosure by physicians, but not by pharmacists. Such limited
protection is not sufficient because pharmacists may have
substantial access to patient information.
C. Congress Failsto ProperlyProtect Medical Privacy
Congress has failed to provide more privacy protection than
do the states. In fact, although Congress self-imposed an August
21, 1999, deadline to pass new laws that set standards for
protecting the confidentiality of medical records, 223 Congress
22 4
failed to meet it.

In 1999, Congress considered several privacy bills. On July
15, 1999, the House Committee on Government Reform
Subcommittee on Government Management, Information, and
Technology heard testimony 225 on the merits of House Bill H.R.
88,226 which would have repealed the Shelby Amendment to the
FOIA, 2 27 which limits medical privacy 2 28 and enhances access to
The Shelby Amendment
federally funded research data. 22 9
requires non-profit organizations conducting research to provide
the government with raw data that identifies the individuals who
were subject to the research, after which a government agency
decides whether to allow public access to the data. 2 30 The data is

220. Id.
221. Id. at 1044.
222. Id.
223. Wheeler, supra note 40, at A21.
224. Id.
225. Treasury and General Government AppropriationAct of 1999: Hearingon H.R. 88
Before the Subcomm. on Gov't Mgmt., Info. and Tech. of the House Comm. on Gov't
Reform, 106th Cong. (1999) at http://web.lexis-nexis.com/congcomp. [hereinafter Hearing
on H.R. 88].
226. H.R. 88, 106th Cong. (1999).
227. Omnibus and Consolidated Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, Pub. L.
No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (1998).
228. See Hearing on H.R. 88, supra note 225 (statement of Rep. Stephen Horn (RCal.), Chairman, House Subcommittee on Government Management, Information, and
Technology).
229. Id.
230. Id. (statement of Bruce Alberts, M.D., President, National Academy of Sciences).
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231
not aggregated nor edited before being sent to the agency.
Once the agency allows the public to access the data, it cannot
place restrictions on who obtains the records or their intended
Amendment, violation of
use. 232 As a result, under the Shelby
233
patient's privacy rights is permitted.
While the FOIA does contain an exemption for personal
medical data234 that keeps individual names and other identifying
factors confidential, 235 the FOIA is not an "appropriate
mechanism" to protect patient privacy from the Shelby
Amendment's required disclosure of data collected by non-private
organizations 236 because the Shelby Amendment requires that a
researcher provide the government with unedited data, at which
point the agency may or may not edit the data of any personal
indicators. 237 In addition, the FOIA's existing privacy mechanisms
are not appropriate to protect against the Shelby Amendment
because it is possible to identify the patient using non-identifying
data, such as place of birth, occupation, marital status, and other
238
general information.
On July 15, 1999, the House also held a hearing on the
Medical Information Protection Act of 1999.239 The Consortium
for Citizens with Disabilities (CCD), an interest group
representing people with disabilities, 240 sought to have Congress
require that individuals be notified in writing regarding how their
medical records are used and when their individually identifiable
information is disclosed to a third party. 241 The notice would have
included information on the health care provider's policy for
making disclosures with or without the patient's authorization,
what records are being accessed, by whom, and how to refuse

231. See id.
232. See id. (statement of Rep. Stephen Horn (R-Cal.)).
233. See id. (statement of Harold Varmus, M.D., Director, National Institutes of
Health, Department of Health and Human Services).
234. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1994).
235. Hearing on H.R. 88, supra note 225 (statement of Harold Varmus, M.D.).
236. Id. (statement of Bruce Alberts).
237. Id. (statement of Harold Varmus, M.D.).
238. Id.
239. Medical Information Protection and Research Enhancement Act of 1999: Hearing
on H.R. 2470 Before the Subcomm. on Health and Env't Comm. on Commerce, 106th
Cong. (1999) [hereinafter Hearing on H.R. 2470].
240. Id. at 39 (statement of Chai Feldblum, Law Professor, Director of Federal
Legislation Clinic, Georgetown Law School).
241. Id. at 96.

Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 23:41

authorization of disclosure, if the policy allows for patient's
refusal. 242 The Act, however, would have continued to allow
and
entities to use consumers' health information for treatment
243
authorization.
consumer
obtaining
health research without
Another House Bill 24 4 would have allowed consumers to have

a reasonable opportunity to limit the use and disclosure of health
information beyond the existing industry limitations on such
disclosure to the third
disclosure. 245 Patients' authorization of 246
party, however, would still not be required.
The CCD asked the House to require that, under the Medical
Information Protection Act, 24 7 disclosure of personally identifiable

health information should be allowed only "for purposes
reasonably related to the purpose for which the information was
248
collected, and for which the patient had been given notice."
These House Bills represent Congressional concern regarding
disclosure of identifying personal information without the patient's
consent, rather than with anonymous information. The CCD,
hoping for more stringent limitations on health information
disclosure, nevertheless indicated that the federal government
should enact legislation that establishes the bare minimum
required for protection of individual privacy rights, 249 leaving state
legislatures the opportunity to "continue to explore ways in which
to better protect the privacy of medical information in their
250
particular states."
V. AN OVERVIEW OF MEDICAL PRIVACY TRENDS

A. Medical Privacy Trends in the United Kingdom
The Source Informatics cases were monumental in evidencing
Source
medical privacy trends in the United Kingdom.
Informatics argued that before the British Department of Health

242.
243.

Id.
Id.

244. H.R. 1941, 106th Cong. (1999).
245. Hearingon H. R. 2470, supra note 239, at 97.
246. Id.
247. H.R. 2470, 106th Cong. (1999).
248. Hearing on H.R. 2470, supra note 239, at 97.
249. See id. at 104.
250. Id. But as previously discussed, some states have not recognized substantial
patient confidentiality rights. See discussion supra Part IV.B.
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issued its policy, the publication of anonymous information to
pharmaceutical countries was uncontroversial. 251 It emphasized
252
that release of such information was not a breach of confidence.
Source Informatics argued that the information acquired would be
not only of great commercial value to drug companies, but also
would provide benefits to the medical profession by providing
physicians and pharmacists useful information to monitor their
prescription patterns. 253 The information would allow physicians
prescribing certain medication to be informed quickly of adverse
reactions, product withdrawals, or changes in prescription
information. 254 In light of such benefits, the health care industry
believed that providing data without identifying information did
255
not create legal liability.
Contrary to Source Informatics' assertion, however, a
controversy over this exact issue did exist within the medical
community even before the British Department of Health issued
its policy statement. 256 Although data collection companies did
not need the consent of patients to access their prescription
information, they did require the consent of both the physicians
and pharmacists who maintained the data.257 In practice, however,
some companies may have acquired the information without the
consent of the physicians or pharmacists. 258 Additionally, even
when proper consent was obtained, pharmacists and physicians
were not able to review the information they were submitting to
data collection companies, potentially giving the companies
greater access to information than intended. 259 Accordingly,

251. R. v. Dep't of Health ex parte Source Informatics Ltd., 4 All E.R. 185, 189 (Q.B.
1999), rev'd, 1 All E.R. 786 (C.A. 2000).
252. 4 All E.R. at 188.
253. PrescriptionInformation Remains Confidential,supra note 48, at 45.
254. John Aston, Database Company Seeks Right to Sell Prescription Details, PRESS
ASS'N NEWSFILE, May 18, 1999.
255. See Pharmacy World, supra note 46, at 3.
256. See generally Norton, supra note 11, at 10 (finding troubling confidentiality
problems with Source Informatics' data collection procedures).
257. PrescriptionInformation Remains Confidential,supra note 48, at 45.
258. Norton, supra note 11, at 10. The newspaper acquired a copy of information
provided to data companies, which identified names of several physicians who prescribed
medications. Id. Of the two physicians in the list that were contacted by the newspaper,
neither consented to the sale of information. Id. Nonetheless, a Source Informatics'
spokesperson stated that the information it obtained was acquired according to proper
procedure. Id.
259. Id.
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concerns regarding the information obtained by data collection
companies already existed before the British Department of
Health issued its statement.
In a 1996 newspaper article adopted from a speech, Sir
Thomas Bingham, Lord Chief Justice, stated that in the United
Kingdom there was "no recognition of a general right to
privacy." 260 He noted, however, that the courts recently "have
extended the remedy for breach of confidence to afford a measure
of protection for rights of personal privacy." 261 Yet, despite the
existing Common Law and recent statutory privacy provisions,
"there are other [situations] in which privacy is infringed and to
which [existing laws] do not apply, leaving the victim without a
remedy." 262 Chief Justice Bingham recommended that Parliament
enact a law that would protect the rights of personal privacy to a
greater extent than the current laws. 263 Specifically, the law
should affect significant privacy infringements such as those that
"would cause substantial distress to an ordinary phlegmatic
person." 264 If the legislature failed to pass such general privacy
legislation, he predicted that the courts would protect additional
265
privacy rights in future cases.
The Source I court gave effect to the Chief Justice's
prediction when it decided that Source Informatics was infringing
upon patients' rights to privacy by collecting and releasing
anonymous medical data. 266 The court noted that while it is
common knowledge that data taken from patients' records is
routinely used for medical research and literature as well as for
obtaining statistics, 267 such practices violate privacy rights. 268 For
public policy reasons, the court deemed the release of such
269
information a breach of confidence.
This decision had several immediate consequences. The
Royal Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain followed the

260. Bingharn, supra note 45, at T16.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. See id.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. See Norton, supra note 11, at 10.
267. R. v. Dep't of Health ex parte Source Informatics Ltd., 4 All E.R. 185, 189 (Q.B.
1999), rev'd, 1 All E.R. 786 (C.A. 2000).
268. 4 All E.R. at 197.
269. Id. at 196-98.
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British Health Department's policy and advised pharmacists not to
provide data to collection companies. 270 In addition, the British
General Medical Council (GMC), intending to issue policy
guidance for physicians that allowed them to obtain implied
consent from patients to disclose records for medical research
271
simply by posting waiting room posters and practice leaflets,
postponed the publication of the guidelines to await the results of
272
Source Informatics' appeal.
After the trial court issued its ruling, GMC believed that the
decision only applied to patient data provided to commercial
companies and not to the record sharing within the National
Health Service for research and audit. 273 For instance, it was
asserted that a physician may be able to disclose anonymous
information to report adverse drug reactions and not come under
this ruling because the information was disclosed for public
interest, rather than for commercial purposes. 274 The ruling,
therefore, created uncertainty regarding whether all use of
prohibited or only use of the data for
anonymous data was
275
purposes.
pecuniary
On appeal, the Source II court took a different position
when it reversed the trial court's decision 276 and refused to
recognize the patient's right to privacy in anonymous medical
data.277 Interestingly, the court acknowledged that, in the United
Kingdom, a pharmacist owes a duty of confidentiality to a
to a
patient. 278 As discussed below, the duty owed by a pharmacist
279
patient receives little attention in the United States.

270. Pharmacy World, supra note 43, at 3.
271. Thomlinson & Thakor, supra note 21, at 1.
272. Lisa Tomlinson, Law Enforcer Doubts GMC Disclosure Rules, PULSE, Aug. 21,
1999, at 3.
273. Thomlinson & Thakor, supra note 21, at 1.
274. Make Sure of Security Needs, supra note 52, at 21.
275. See id.
276. See R. v. Dep't of Health ex parte Source Informatics Ltd., 1 All E.R. 786, 797
(C.A. 2000), rev'g 4 All E.R. 185 (Q.B. 1999).
277. 1 All E.R. at 797. "[Clourts ... should not be too ready to import an equitable
obligation of confidence in a marginal case." Id. at 794 (citing Smith Kline & French Labs.
(Austl.) Ltd. v. Sec'y to the Dep't of Cmty. Servs. and Health, 99 A.L.R. 679, 691-92
(1991)).
278. 1 All E.R. at 796 (noting that a pharmacist is a "confidant [who] is placed under a
duty of good faith to the confider").
279. See discussion supra Part IV.B.2.
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B. Medical Privacy Trends in the United States
1. Rights Sought in the United Kingdom Remain Unchallenged in
the United States
Although U.S. law protects some personal data from
unwarranted invasion, the law does not recognize individual
280
personal data as an interest that needs substantial protection.
The general public, on the other hand, far from being passive
about protections afforded to anonymous medical data gathered
for marketing and other research, is concerned about medical
281
privacy and protecting the confidentiality of patient records.
According to the 2000 Gallup Poll conducted on behalf of the
Institute for Health Freedom, the vast majority of U.S. residents
oppose allowing third parties access to medical data without
patient permission. 282 Many individuals oppose access by any
group 283 and sixty-seven percent of adults polled indicated that
284
they would oppose access to medical researchers.
While medical privacy does receive some protection in the
United States, 285 these protections are superficial. 286 Moreover,
not only do U.S. laws fail to protect non-identifiable information,
privacy bills considered by Congress in 1999 explicitly permit
release of such information. 287 Consequently, unlike the United

280. See Roch, supra note 33, at 93. Federal laws are subject to numerous exceptions
and apply to limited types of data. See id. at 88-93.
281. Gostin, supra note 3, at 453-54.
282. See THE GALLOP ORGANIZATION, supra note 116.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. See discussion supra Part IV.
286. See Rackett, supra note 166, at 178-83. In addition, few states have enacted
comprehensive medical confidentiality laws and those in effect are subject to disclosure
exceptions. Id. at 181-83. See also Helena Gail Rubinstein, If l Am Only for Myself, What
Am I?: A Communitarian Look at the Privacy Stalemate, 25 AM. J.L. & MED. 203, 203
(1999) ("U.S. Senator Edward M. Kennedy asserts, '[t]oday, video rental records have
greater protection than sensitive medical information."') (alteration in original).
287. See Rubinstein, supra note 286, at 220. Several recent federal medical privacy
bills required only that identifiable information be protected. The Medical Privacy and
Security Act, S. 573, 106th Cong., 1st Sess. (1999), sponsored by Senator Patrick Leahy
(D-Vt.), required that all personal identifiers be removed before disclosure is permitted.
Rubinstein, supra note 286, at 219. The Health Care Personal Information NonDisclosure Act, S. 578. 106th Cong. 1st Sess. (1999), sponsored by Senator James Jeffords
(D-Vt.) and Senator Chris Dodd (D-Conn.), permits the disclosure of information but
requires that the data does not reveal the identity of the patient. Rubinstein, supra note
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Kingdom, the lack of privacy protection in non-identifying data
288
has not been challenged in the United States.
2. New Database Creates Risks That Medical Information Is
Being Misused
In the United States, patient records are increasingly
maintained and transmitted electronically, allowing insurance
companies, hospitals, physicians, and pharmacists to exchange
information about patients. 289 Health database organizations, with
their chief goal of publicly releasing and analyzing information,
have accelerated the collection, storage, and use of electronic
data.290 The information obtained includes patient-identifiable
data, as well as aggregate, non-identifiable data. 291 These
organizations can legally use and sell the data for numerous
purposes that a patient would not anticipate when the data is
collected. 292 The list of groups using patient computerized records
is exhaustive. 293 Accordingly, the issue is to what extent should a
294
third party be allowed to access a patient's medical records?
According to a Congressional Research Service study, at least
400 people legally have access to a patient's records during an
average hospital stay. 295 The current availability of medical
information raises the possibility that the data may fall into the
296
hands of groups who might use it for inappropriate purposes.
Hence, some scholars wonder whether too little has been made of

286, at 219. The Medical Information Protection Act of 1999, S. 881, 106th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1999), introduced by Senator Robert Bennett (R-Utah), explicitly permits disclosure of
data from which direct identifiers have been removed. Rubinstein, supra note 286, at 219.
288. Exhaustive research for this Note revealed that the use of anonymous data has
remained unchallenged in U.S. federal, state, and case law. Indeed, the trial court in
Source I indicated that this was a novel legal issue. R. v. Dep't of Health ex parte Source
Informatics Ltd., 4 All E.R. 185, 189 (Q.B. 1999), rev'd, 1 All E.R. 786 (C.A. 2000).
289. Wheeler, supra note 40, at A21.
290. Gostin, supra note 3, at 463.
291. Id. at 464.
292. Id. at 488.
293. Id. at 485-86.
294. Kasper Zeuthen, Health Information Moves Too Freely in United States, THE
DAILY YOMIURI, Sept. 7, 1999, at 7.
295. Id. Cf Rackett, supra note 166, at 173 (estimating at least eighty people).
296. See Chadwick, supra note 109, at 443. For example, in 1996, thirty-five percent of
the Fortune 500 companies acknowledged that they used personal health information in
making employment decisions.
Zeuthen, supra note 294, at 7.
In 1992, U.S.
Representative Nydia Velazquez's hospital records were anonymously released to the
press in attempt to sabotage her bid for a Congressional seat. Id.
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the threat to individual privacy posed by medical information
297
systems.
New medical records databases are continually established for
298
greater convenience of medical service providers and patients.
On August 23, 1999, WellMed, Inc., a privately held company in
Portland, announced that corporations as well as health plans and
care service providers would begin utilizing its online personal
health database, 299 the Personal Health Manager, which allows
consumers to store and retrieve information that is customized to
their own health interests or medical conditions. 300 The database
allows individuals to store and monitor health information online,
as well as maintain children's immunization records and elderly
patients' prescriptions, which can easily be accessed and provided
to schools, new doctors, and others. 30 1 The program allows for
storage of information online with "complete security,
confidentiality[,] and privacy." 30 2 In case of emergency, however,
a company operator can access the information and fax the
customer's Emergency Information to the "appropriate contact at
the hospital. ' 30 3 One must question how private the data is when
it is exposed to so many people, especially considering that the
data being processed can be directly linked to an identifiable
person.
In addition, virtual drugstores, selling prescription and nonprescription drugs, are a new trend on the Internet. 30 4 Most major
websites promise that they "'will not sell, rent[,] or loan any
recognizable personal information to a third-party, unless legally
required to do so."'305 Thus, when a customer or patient provides
medical information to healthcare Web sites, anonymous
information might still be given to a third party.

297. See Lombardo, supra note 118, at 589.
298. See WellMed Introduces Industry's First Comprehensive Personal Health
Management System Including Online Health Record, PR NEWSWIRE, Aug. 23, 1999,
availableat LEXIS, News Library, Allnws File [hereinafter WellMed].
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Stephanie Harvin, http://www.drugs.com, THE POST AND COURIER, Aug. 2, 1999,
at 8-B.
305. Id. (emphasis added).
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VI. UNLIKE THE UNITED KINGDOM, THE UNITED STATES SHOULD

AFFORD PROTECTION FOR PRIVACY IN ANONYMOUS DATA

The outcome of the Source II decision is not surprising
because there are public health benefits in providing access to
patients' records to certain third parties. 30 6 Personal medical
records available on Web sites, such as the one offered by
30 8
WellMed, 30 7 allow patients to access diagnoses from home.
Doctors dealing with patients' ailments could obtain prescription
records, the nature of the complaint, and the history of the
treatment online, then diagnose potential reasons for the
complaint. 30 9 General medical records databases give physicians
insight to develop new disease prevention strategies, treatments,
and cures. 310 These databases can also help scientists study the
evolution of hereditary diseases. 311 Furthermore, researchers
improve the quality of health care by analyzing personal
identifiable prescription information, identifying patients who
might be eligible for a change in their312prescription, and contacting
the physicians treating these patients.
Nevertheless, the British appellate court took a step
backward for the protection of privacy rights by adopting the
"reasonable pharmacist" standard, which permits a pharmacist to
disclose anonymous data to an unauthorized third party so long as
it would not be unconscionable to a reasonable pharmacist. 313 The
court should have (1) recognized a privacy right in anonymous
data, (2) considered whether a reasonable person would oppose
use of the data, and (3) determined whether there are public policy
reasons to outweigh the individual privacy rights. The appellate
306. See Wheeler, supra note 40, at A21 (noting that some researchers claim to need
access to medical records to properly conduct research).
307. WellMed, supra note 298.
308. Pam Abramowitz, Computerized Patient Records: Health Care Finally Moves to
Place the Consumer at the Center of its IT Revolution, THE BOND BUYER (Health Care
Finance Supp.), Sept. 1999, at 12a.
309. Id.
310. Lawrence O'Rourke, Are Your Private Records Private?,TOPEKA CAP. J., June
15,1999, availableat LEXIS, News Library, Allnws File.
311. Id.
312. Medical Records Confidentiality in the Modern Delivery of Health Care: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Health and Env't of the House on Commerce, 106th Cong. 69
(1999) (prepared statement of Terry S. Latanich, Senior Vice-President of Mercko-Medco
Managed Care) (providing an example of how patient-identifiable information is used).
313. R. v. Dep't of Health ex parte Source Informatics Ltd., 1 All E.R. 786, 797 (C.A.
2000), rev'g4 All E.R. 185 (Q.B. 1999).
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court's analysis, however, rejected these important principles used
by U.S. courts, which were argued by the British Department of
Health in the Source Informatics cases.
First, the Source II court reasoned that when a patient can be
assured that identifying information will be protected, that patient
has no interest in how anonymous data is used. 314 The appellate
court's definition of privacy conforms with the limited definition
used by some scholars who propose that privacy is invaded only
when identity is revealed. 315 Other scholars, such as Charles Fried,
however, argue that privacy is a fundamental notion that must not
be easily disturbed. 316 A primary justification for respecting the
privacy of an individual is the principle of respect for the
individual's autonomy. 317
An individual should have the
autonomy to decide who gets to use personal data. 318 For Fried,
therefore, privacy is lost immediately when a person loses the
ability to grant or deny access to information, whereas other
scholars allow third parties to access information without
authorization as long as the patient is not identified.
Both the Source I and Source II courts acted under the
presumption that anonymity can be guaranteed. 319 In reality,
however, "complete anonymity is extraordinarily difficult, if not
impossible, to attain[,] ' 320 because even in the absence of
identifying information, it is possible to aggregate data to
determine the person's identity. 321 Assuming, however, that
anonymity can be guaranteed, the exposure of the patient's
identity is not the only possible circumstance that can raise a cause
of action for invasion of privacy. 322 Courts have recognized that

314. 1 All E.R. at 797.
315. Gostin et al., supra note 38, at 18-19 (noting that some scholars define privacy as
the condition of limited accessibility to the person such that it does not encroach on the
person's solitude, secrecy, and anonymity, suggesting that privacy is not invaded if the
person's anonymity is guaranteed).
316. See Fried, supra note 1, at 477-78.
317. Gostin et al., supra note 38, at 21.
318. Id. at 19 (noting that a lack of control over who may use a person's information,
such as when a person is subjected to an involuntary blood test, results in the loss of
"decisional privacy").
319. R. v. Dep't of Health ex parte Source Informatics Ltd., 1 All E.R. 786, 789 (C.A.
2000), rev'g 4 All E.R. 185 (Q.B. 1999).
320. Wheeler, supra note 40, at A24.
321. Id.
322. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (noting that the right to privacy
encompasses "a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy") (emphasis
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an invasion of privacy does not necessarily involve identity, but
rather occurs when a person is deprived of the autonomy to make
decisions. 323 Therefore, even if the anonymity is guaranteed,
invasion of privacy occurs when the patient is deprived
of the
3 24
autonomy to determine how the information is used.

Second, once the law recognizes that a person has an interest
in protecting access to information, whether anonymous or
identifiable, not every use of that information violates the right to
privacy. 325 Only unauthorized access to the information that
would offend a reasonable person's expectations for the use of the
information would violate that right. 326 This indicates that
invasion of privacy exists when a reasonable person would object
to the use. The problem that the appellate court's ruling raises is
determining whether to use a reasonable patient standard or that
327
of a reasonable pharmacist.
In both invasion of privacy and breach of confidentiality
cases, it makes more sense to use a reasonable patient standard.
Although it is common in tort law, such as in malpractice claims, to
apply the "reasonable professional" standard, 328 the right of
privacy is an individual right that should be defined from the
329
viewpoint of the victim of the breach, not its perpetrator.
Arguably any use of data that is unauthorized or even unknown to
the patient could be objectionable to a reasonable patient. This
view would be in conformity with the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, which defines invasion of privacy as publication of
' 330
information that is "highly offensive to a reasonable person[,]
namely the patient. This is not the view adopted by the appellate

added).
323. See id.
324. See Fried, supra note 1, at 482.
325. See R. v. Dep't of Health exparte Source Informatics Ltd., 1 All E.R. 786, 796
(C.A.2000), rev'g 4 All E.R. 185 (Q.B. 1999).
326. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D(a) (1977).
But see Source
Informatics Ltd., 1 All E.R. at 796 (holding that a reasonable pharmacist standard should
be applied).
327. See, e.g., Urbaniak v. Newton, 277 Cal. Rptr. 354, 361 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (noting
that the patient's "reasonable expectations of privacy" would determine whether the
privacy interest deserves protection against abusive disclosure of data).
328. See, e.g., Osborn v. Irwin Memorial Blood Bank, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 101, 127-28
(applying a standard of reasonable degree of care exercised by other blood banks in a
malpractice case).
329. See, e.g., Urbaniak,277 Cal. Rptr. at 361 (using a reasonable patient standard).
330. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D(a) (1977).
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court in Source //.331 The court, instead, took the view that a
pharmacist improperly discloses the information only when a
reasonable pharmacist would find the disclosure to an
332
unauthorized party unconscionable.
Third, once the patient's interest in the data is recognized, it
may be proper to invade privacy rights when public interest
outweighs the personal right. 333 The Source II court, instead of
recognizing privacy rights in anonymous data and weighing them
against the public interest in the data, denied the existence of the
patient's privacy interests and allowed the publication of the data
334
regardless of the weight of public interest.
Contrary to the Source II decision in the United Kingdom,
the law in the United States weighs public policy considerations
against the individual right to privacy. 335 In the United States,
once the duty of confidentiality arises, the existence of that duty
does not preclude publicizing confidential information when the
public interest in the data outweighs the patient's right to
privacy. 336 There may be a significant public policy reasons to
allow a pharmacist to sell anonymous data for use by third
parties. 337 For instance, modern medicine might not exist without
the wide distribution of medical data between different segments
338
of the medical community.
The Source Informatics cases, however, involved data
distribution for purely pecuniary purposes, rather than for
research. 339 While a U.S. court might decide that pecuniary need
for the data does not outweigh patients' privacy rights, 340 the
331. See Source Informatics Ltd., 1 All E.R. at 797.
332. Id.
333. See, e.g., Urbaniak, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 360-61 (holding that the public's interest in
the disclosure of a patient's HIV-positive status for the purpose of alerting a healthcare
worker of the need for safety precautions outweighs the patient's privacy rights).
334. See Source Informatics Ltd., 1 All E.R. at 796-97.
335. See, e.g., United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 578 (3d Cir.
1980); see also Urbaniak,277 Cal. Rptr. at 361.
336. Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 578.
337. See Rubinstein, supra note 286, at 224-31, for a discussion on communitarian
policy reasons to allow use of medical data without the patient's consent.
338. See Gostin, supra note 3, at 451-52.
339. See Source Informatics Ltd., 1 All E.R. at 788 (noting that Source Informatics
buys the data and resells it to pharmaceuticals so that they can better market their
products).
340. See, e.g., Hill v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 865 P.2d 633, 657 (Cal. 1994)
(requiring sufficient countervailing interests to outweigh the right to privacy under the
California state constitution); Stenger v. Lehigh Valley Hosp. Ctr., 530 Pa. 426, 437 (1992)
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British appellate court was not concerned with the weight of public
policy considerations. 341 Instead, the British court held that
patients have no property interests in anonymous data. 342 Thus, in
the United Kingdom, a patient cannot object
when the data is used
343
for unauthorized purposes by third parties.
Courts should recognize that use of anonymous information
violates patients' privacy. In suggesting comprehensive U.S.
federal legislation to protect medical privacy, scholars have
34 4
advanced several principles for fair information practices.
Included are the principles that information should be collected
only for the purpose for which it was intended and should not be
used for other purposes without the patient's consent. 3 45 These
principles should be used equally for identifiable as well as nonidentifiable data because the patient did not consent to the use of
the data by third parties.
Furthermore, privacy should be defined as the right to control
access to information 34 6 because this definition provides greater
protection against unauthorized use. Additionally, to ensure that
doctors, pharmacists, and interested third parties respect patient
privacy, patients should be able to state a claim against anyone
who accesses private information.
In the United Kingdom,
medical personnel other than physicians, such as pharmacists, can
be liable for breach of confidentiality for making identifiable
information public, 34 7 but in the United States, the pharmacist
cannot be held liable. 34 8 This prevents a U.S. patient from

(requiring compelling state interests to outweigh a person's privacy rights under the
Pennsylvania state constitution).
341. Source Informatics Ltd., 1 All E.R. at 790.
342. Id. at 797. Generally, U.S. laws state that medical records are the sole property of
the health care pjrovider. Rubenstein, supra note 286, at 207. This view mirrors the British
appellate court's holding that the patient has no property rights in anonymous data.
Source Informatics Ltd., 1 All E.R. at 797. Most states, however, require health care
professionals to ensure the patient's confidentiality and therefore do not give these
professionals an absolute right to use the information. Rubenstein, supra note 286, at 20708. It is unknown whether a U.S. court would require the same duty of confidentiality for
anonymous data.
343. Source Informatics Ltd., I All E.R. at 796-97.
344. Rackett, supra note 166, at 188.
345. Id.
346. Fried, supra note 1, at 483.
347. Source Informatics Ltd., 1 All E.R. at 796.
348. See discussion supra Part IV.B.
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controlling access to information, thus any data held by a non349
physician can potentially become public.
Courts should recognize that all unauthorized use of that data
is, by definition, an invasion of privacy. The patient is deprived of
the right to control access to the information, which is detrimental
to the patient's rights. 350 Although courts should be able to allow
disclosure if the public interest in the information is strong, the
public interest must involve a social necessity that outweighs the
basic individual right of privacy. 351 The interest of a company in
the data to better market its products, for example, should not be
compelling enough to overcome the fundamental right of privacy.
Finally, in deciding whether privacy rights are violated when a
pharmacist divulges anonymous data to a third party without the
patient's consent, courts should use a reasonablepatient standard,
not a reasonable pharmacist standard. 352 The question is not
whether the pharmacist violated a professional duty to a client, but
rather, whether the pharmacist violated a patient's fundamental
right to control access to personal information. 353 Although the
Source I court did limit the ability of a pharmacist and physician to
use the data, it did so nominally. The reasonable pharmacist
standard does not permit the pharmacist to use data in a way that a
reasonable pharmacist would find unconscionable, 354 but what
amounts to unconscionable is restricted only by the subjective
need of the medical community that uses the data in an
unauthorized manner. A claim for invasion of privacy should not
be defined from the viewpoint of the invader; rather it should be
based on the viewpoint of the victim. By definition, invasion of
privacy involves the victim's sense of violation, not the
professional's sense of unconscionability. 355

349. See, e.g., Evans v. Rite Aid Corp., 478 S.E.2d 846 (S.C. 1996).
350. Fried, supra note 1, at 485 ("To be deprived of this control not only over what we
do but over who we are is the ultimate assault on liberty, personality, and self-respect.").
351. R. v. Dep't of Health ex parte Source Informatics Ltd., 4 All E.R. 185, 196 (Q.B.
1999), rev'd, 1 All E.R. 786 (C.A. 2000) (suggesting that if public policy could outweigh
privacy interests, the sale of patient prescription data would be allowed).
352. Compare Source Informatics Ltd., 1 All E.R. at 796 (using a reasonable
pharmacist standard) with Urbaniak v. Newton, 277 Cal. Rptr. 354, 361 (Cal. Ct. App.
1991) (using a reasonable patient standard).
353. See Fried, supra note 1, at 483.
354. Source Informatics Ltd., 1 All E.R. at 796.
355. See id.

20011

Medical Privacy Rights in Anonymous Data
VII. CONCLUSION

Medical data that is obtained by physicians and pharmacists
specifically to provide care to the patient must not be given to
unauthorized third parties unless the public needs outweigh the
patient's privacy rights. The patient parted with the data for that
specific purpose and must be able to retain the ability to control
who accesses it. Loss of that control amounts to loss of privacy
rights. Therefore, the lower court reached the proper decision in
Source I when it held that unauthorized use of anonymous data, in
the absence of a showing of a strong public interest, violates
patients' right to privacy. 356 In reversing the trial court, the
appellate court not only limited patients' rights, it created a
precedent where the role of public policy is ignored and patients'
interests are subjugated in favor of the medical community's
commercial interests.
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